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Research Highlights and Abstract
This article:
• Covers new empirical terrain in the study of depoliticisation, with an in-depth case
study of health technology regulation;
• Analyses depoliticisation from a novel analytical perspective, examining how
depoliticised institutions are resilient to external pressure for politicisation;
• Posits a distinctive framework for analysing resilience, drawing on cognate litera-
tures on policy networks and agencification;
• Raises interesting and distinctive questions about the nature of depoliticisation
in advanced liberal democracies, arguing it is more contested than commonly
acknowledged.
Depoliticisation as a concept offers distinctive insights into how governments attempt to relieve
political pressures in liberal democracies. Analysis has examined the effects of depoliticisation tactics
on the public, but not how those tactics are sustained during moments of political tension. Drawing
on policy networks and agencification literatures, this article examines how these tactics are resilient
against pressure for politicisation. Using an in-depth case study of the controversial appraisal of
cancer drug Herceptin in 2005/6 by the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE), the article examines how ‘resilient’ NICE was to external politicisation. It is argued that
NICE was resilient because it was effectively ‘insulated’ by formal procedures and informal norms
of deference to scientific expertise. This mechanism is termed ‘institutional double glazing’. The
conclusion suggests developments to the conceptual and methodological framework of
depoliticisation, and highlights theoretical insights into the nature of ‘anti-politics’ in contempo-
rary democracies.
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The concept of depoliticisation has recently become popular in political science
(Wood and Flinders 2014), describing attempts by politicians to ‘place at one
remove the political character of decision making’, retaining arm’s length control of
policy whilst simultaneously foregoing responsibility for unpopular reforms or
failures (Burnham 2001, 128; Flinders and Buller, 2006). Depoliticisation is not a
new phenomenon (Fawcett and Marsh 2014)—the problematique of separating
‘politics’ from ‘administration’ and questions of central control or discretion are
age-old dilemmas in policy research. However, debates over the past twenty years
about the alleged ‘hollowing out’ of the state have led to a heightened focus on how
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ministers in core executives exercise power, with many studies arguing that central
state capacity is being reduced (for a critical review see Matthews 2013).
Depoliticisation as a concept is interesting because it turns this common argument
on its head. Situated within the broader ‘critical’ governance literature (Davies
2011) depoliticisation highlights how alleged ‘hollowing out’ through delegation to
‘arm’s length’ bodies actually enhances politicians’ capacities to institute their ideo-
logical preferences within a set of concrete rules and ‘expert’ decision making
procedures (Flinders 2008). These become embedded through the process by which
those decisions are made to appear unchallengeable or ‘non-political’
(depoliticised).
How does this process work in practice, though? Do allegedly ‘expert’ arm’s length
institutions remain embedded over time, and how are their decision-making pro-
cesses resistant to challenge? Answering these questions involves, in part, exam-
ining how central state ministers resist pressure to intervene in (‘re-politicise’) these
‘arm’s length’ bodies, hence demonstrating their effective ‘institutionalisation’.
Existing research has examined depoliticisation as a way of deflecting blame from
politicians for policy failure (Kettell 2008) and conversely on the success of
re-politicisation strategies (Kuzemko 2014). It has not, however, analysed how
putatively depoliticised bodies are resilient against pressures for re-politicisation in
external policy networks. Hence, the question this article addresses is: how do
depoliticised bodies retain and maintain their depoliticised status under conditions
of political stress? In addressing this question the article contributes distinctively to
what Hay (2014) calls a ‘second generation’ of depoliticisation research. This diver-
sifies into new policy areas and examines distinctive research questions, but with a
continued concern for critically interrogating the mechanisms that often prevent us
in democratic societies from seeing substantively our collective choices.
In order to achieve this aim the article posits an analytical framework for examining
the tensions and stresses on depoliticised bodies, building on Hay’s (2007) insights
on pressures for politicisation and utilising literature on policy networks and
agencification. The framework is applied to an in-depth case study of the contro-
versial appraisal process for Herceptin, a new biomedical drug for treating early-
stage HER2-positive breast cancer in 2005/6 under the British New Labour
government. This case is ideal because it focuses on an ostensibly ‘depoliticised’
institutional relationship operating within a context of high public pressure. A
delegated expert body—the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence
(NICE)—was responsible for appraising Herceptin for free distribution on the
National Health Service (NHS), but there was severe pressure from media and
interest groups for ministerial intervention to approve the drug immediately. NICE
hence provides a critical case of a ‘depoliticised’ agency in a ‘politicised’ context, and
thus fertile empirical territory for uncovering the mechanisms through which the
‘depoliticised’ nature of the institution is sustained in practice. This case is also
empirically distinctive in relation to existing literature on depoliticisation, which
focuses almost exclusively on the economic policy field (Kettell 2008; Rogers 2009).
Indeed, investigating depoliticisation in health technology regulation has arguably
even greater pertinence, given the importance of long-term public trust and
confidence in organisations like NICE as truly autonomous judges of clinical
cost-effectiveness.
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Analysing the case, it is argued that high levels of pressure from outside the state to
intervene in the appraisal did not lead to intervention—politicisation—in the deci-
sion making process itself. This is because decision making was highly formalised
with strict procedures of stakeholder input, and informal norms of deference to
scientific expertise created what this article terms ‘institutional double glazing’ that
prevented ministerial intervention. Formal and informal institutional mechanisms
hence countered external politicisation to protect the depoliticised body from inter-
ference. In making this argument the article utilises qualitative and quantitative
data gathered from sixteen semi-structured elite interviews with critical actors1
during the appraisal, analysis of government documents, media coverage, parlia-
mentary debates and a freedom of information request.
This article is hence organised around three central ‘hooks’ or claims to distinctive-
ness at the micro (empirical), meso (analytical), and macro (theoretical) levels:
(1) Micro (empirical): this article covers new empirical terrain in the study of
depoliticisation (health technology regulation) from a novel analytical per-
spective (examining the resilience of depoliticised bodies).
(2) Meso (analytical): this article posits a distinctive analytical framework for assess-
ing the resilience of depoliticised bodies, developing Hay’s (2007) insights into
(de)politicisation processes by engaging with cognate literatures on policy
networks and agencification.
(3) Macro (theoretical): this article offers important insights into the nature of
depoliticisation as a process, arguing it is the product of periodic contestation
and resistance, rather than of top-down ideological assimilation.
In making these contributions, this article is divided into six sections. Firstly, it
briefly provides a critical review of the depoliticisation literature. Secondly, it draws
from the policy network and agencification literatures, and Hay’s (2007) model to
construct a framework for assessing resilience. The third section introduces the
Herceptin case before the fourth section examines the emergence of an ‘issue
network’ during the Herceptin crisis, creating pressures towards politicisation, and
the fifth section analyses how NICE was resilient to this external pressure, retaining
its ‘depoliticised’ status. The conclusion then argues for further methodological
integration of ‘depoliticisation’ with cognate literatures, building upon Kettell’s
(2008) methodology for assessing depoliticisation strategies, and for further com-
parative analysis of the nature and form of depoliticisation in different policy areas,
theorised as the institutional embedding of particular modes of policy-making in a
context of periodic political struggle and contestation.
Depoliticisation, Governance and Resilience
Academic work on depoliticisation has blossomed in recent years, particularly in
relation to governance and public policy (Burnham 2001; Buller and Flinders 2005;
Kettell 2008; Rogers 2009; Beveridge 2012). Depoliticisation, as defined here, is ‘the
range of tools, mechanisms and institutions through which politicians can attempt
to move to an indirect governing relationship and/or seek to persuade the demos
that they can no longer be reasonably held responsible for a certain issue, policy
field or decision’ (Flinders and Buller 2006, 295–296). Examples of depoliticisation
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‘tactics and tools’ include, most prominently, the delegation of decision making to
supposedly ‘non-political’ arm’s length bodies (ALBs), which are widely interpreted
by the public as being ‘non-political’ (Flinders 2008, ch. 7). Empirical research has
focused on the success of depoliticisation (Kettell 2008; Rogers 2009; Beveridge
2012), how depoliticised policy areas are re-politicised (Kuzemko 2014) and ‘the
broader relationship between depoliticising and politicising dynamics’ (Jenkins
2011, 158; Bates et al. 2014).
While existing research has begun delving into this ‘broader relationship’, it has not
yet examined how the ‘indirect governing relationship’ identified by Flinders and
Buller (2006) is maintained, despite external pressures for politicisation. Scholars
such as Moran (2003, 139), for example, note the prevalence of ‘hyper-
politicisation’, or how ‘the quango world (being) drawn inexorably into an increas-
ingly open, partisan and juridified world’. The extent to which these ‘quangos’ are
able to resist such pressures is a key factor in determining whether they
are ‘successful’ in retaining their ‘depoliticised’ status over time. Such questions are
important for critically analysing the barriers or obstacles to ‘seeing clearly the
political choices that govern our ostensibly democratic societies’, which Hay (2014,
310) highlights as a key objective of future research. A central point of this article,
then, is specifically to address the question: how do depoliticised institutions retain
their depoliticised status during periods of political stress (crises)?2 This question is
distinctive with regards to the depoliticisation literature but, as we shall see, it is
situated within a much broader literature on governance and policymaking. This
literature offers important tools for addressing the resilience of depoliticisation
substantively.
The Resilience of Depoliticisation: Towards an
Analytical Framework
As the previous section suggests, particular tactics of depoliticisation exist within a
broader political context that contains a range of tensions and pressures for politi-
cisation, and the aim of this article is to bring out how depoliticisation strategies are
resilient against politicising pressures in a way that existing work only suggests
implicitly. A useful heuristic starting point for this task is Hay’s (2007) model of
(de)politicisation processes, shown in Figure 1.
Hay’s model posits three politicisation processes. Politicisation 1 refers to move-
ments from the ‘realm of necessity’ where there is no capacity for human action to
the ‘private’ realm as actors acknowledge humans have the capacity to govern their
environment. Politicisation 2, movement from ‘private’ to ‘public’ realm occurs
when an issue gains acknowledgement as an issue of collective concern through,
for instance, publicity campaigns. Politicisation 3 occurs when this issue becomes of
legislative interest in Parliament and the responsibility of state departments. This
heuristic model suggests the ‘tactics and tools’ of depoliticisation are influenced by
multiple wider processes. Moreover, it frames the systemic tensions and pressures
this article seeks to analyse in an intellectually appealing and exciting single frame-
work of (de)politicisation.
At the same time, however, Hay (2014) also cautions against fundamentally depart-
ing from established analytical approaches. Analysing how non-state actors
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influence the state is far from a new endeavour, as Bendix and Lipset (1957, 87)
stated 50 years ago: ‘political science starts with the state and examines how it
affects society, while political sociology starts with society and examines how it
affects the state’. In policy analysis concepts like ‘iron triangles’, ‘policy whirlpools’,
‘venue shopping’, ‘policy streams’, ‘networks’ and ‘advocacy coalitions’ (for a
review see Cairney 2012) have long proved useful for analysing how non-state
actors influence government. There is also the danger of ‘conceptually stretching’
the notion of politicisation in a way that, within the confines of this article, cannot
be justified. In light of these challenges this article adopts a strategy of identifying
existing approaches that can be combined for analysing the resilience of
depoliticisation by identifying and interrogating points of pressure or tension within
the political system that Hay’s model intimates. Two frameworks are included here:
policy networks and agencification.
Firstly, the extensive literature on policy networks is salient in examining the
intensity or vigour of societal pressure upon the state (Rhodes 1990; Marsh and
Rhodes 1992). Policy network scholars in the ‘British’ school differentiate between
‘issue networks’ and ‘policy communities’ as forms of ‘interest intermediation’
in the transfer of policy demands towards the state, the former being ‘loose’,
disorganised and open to multiple actors, and the latter being ‘tight’,
professionalised and closed to outsiders (Marsh 1998). For Marsh (1998, 16), in an
Figure 1: Hay’s (2007) Heuristic Model of Politicisation/Depoliticisation
Source: Hay 2007, 80
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issue network there is greater conflict over core values and challenge of the policy
status quo, whereas in policy communities ‘all participants share basic values and
accept the legitimacy of (an) outcome’. Moreover, Marsh (1998, 16) highlights an
increased and diversified number of actors involved in policy debates, a fluctuation
of ‘access’ and contacts within the network, and less ability to ‘regulate’ or control
network membership. Policy network analysis often utilises a mixed method
approach, including document analysis, elite interviews, statistics of media cover-
age and parliamentary debates.
Despite critiques of this approach as lacking ‘explanatory power’ (Dowding 1995)
policy network analysis is important because it highlights the intensity of pressure
exerted upon government. Potential links with ‘politicisation’ have been noted in
policy network studies (e.g. Wilkinson et al. 2010, 332). Smith (1991), for example,
argues that issue networks tend to be more ‘politicised’ as they include more
dissenting voices and place greater pressure upon central government. By contrast,
policy communities ‘depoliticise a policy arena by excluding groups which are likely
to disagree with the established policy agenda from the policy-making process’
(Smith 1991, 236). The invocation of these concepts highlights a conceptual
link that might be developed between types of policy network and levels of
(de)politicisation.
Secondly, literature on ‘agencification’ is also concerned with tensions and pres-
sures, except at the intersection between arm’s length bodies (ALBs) and central
ministerial departments (see Gilardi and Maggetti 2011). Of particular interest here
are studies which examine the extent of informal political pressure applied by
central government departments on ALBs (e.g. Maggetti 2007). This work analyses
the de facto autonomy of ALBs, or their ‘actual existing’ independence from central
government. De facto autonomy can be defined as ‘the extent of regulators’ effective
autonomy as they manage their day-to-day regulatory actions’ (Gilardi and
Maggetti 2011, 204). Empirical assessment can be based upon examination of
semi-structured elite interviews and levels of communication between central
department and delegated body, with greater communication indicating less de facto
autonomy (Maggetti 2007). An analysis of de facto autonomy can be connected with
(de)politicisation, given the focus on ‘measuring informal political influence’
(Flinders and Buller, 2006, 302). Where ALBs are de facto more autonomous, they
are ‘depoliticised’, and where they are less autonomous, they become ‘politicised’.
While not the only bodies of cognate literature, these frameworks are important
because they highlight dynamic tensions at key intermediary points within political
systems (between public networks and central states, and between ministerial
departments and ALBs). Analysing de facto autonomy can determine whether
‘politicisation’ has occurred when evidence shows central departmental actors
either overruling ALB decisions, or increasing interactions with ALBs regarding
particular decisions. If there is evidence of an issue network emerging but not of
central departments intervening in ALBs, this suggests depoliticisation is ‘resilient’.
Explaining this resilience contributes towards a more fine-grained analysis of the
factors that prevent depoliticisation being challenged, which the remainder of this
article attempts to do.
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NICE and the Herceptin Post-code Lottery Crisis
The regulation of new ‘health technologies’ (drugs, medicines, treatments, etc.) ‘in
a number of ways epitomises many of the features of the late-modern British
regulatory state’ (Brown and Calnan 2011, 1). In 1999, The National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellent (NICE) was established by New Labour Health Sec-
retary Frank Dobson to take decision-making power over the funding of drugs for
free prescription on the National Health Service (NHS) away from politicians.
Supposedly, this would end the ‘post-code lottery’ in which only wealthy Primary
Care Trusts (PCTs) could fund expensive treatments. NICE was ‘intended to ensure
that the lottery system under which certain treatments and drugs are available in
one part of the country but not another is changed’ (House of Commons Debate 18
January1999, 323: 592–594) and NICE was given ‘considerable control over its own
organisation and rules of procedure’ to ensure this (Landwehr and Böhm 2011,
681). NICE’s technology appraisal process is a key element of its autonomy, carried
out in a tightly structured manner for up to two years, with little input from the
Department of Health (DH) (Milewa and Barry 2005, 506). This process can be
reduced to roughly six stages:
(1) The European Medicines Agency (EMEA) licenses a ‘technology’ for distribu-
tion around Europe.
(2) DH consults NICE and other groups, and then refers the technology to NICE
for appraisal.
(3) NICE identifies and consults with the policy community, produces an appraisal
scope/timeline and appoints a (university-based) Technology Assessment
Group (TAG).
(4) The TAG writes an evaluation report of the technology’s effectiveness using
the methodology of cost-per Quality-Adjusted Life Years (QALYs).
(5) A Technology Appraisal Committee (TAC) comprised of practitioners from
outside NICE receives evidence from the TAG and submissions from other
consultees (including DH) and produces an Appraisal Consultation Document
(ACD)
(6) The ACD is circulated around consultees for comments and a Final Appraisal
Document is then sent to NICE’s Guidance Executive for approval. PCTs have
a short appeal window but must then implement guidance within 3 months
(see NICE 2001; NICE 2004).
This process leaves little room for intervention from DH, with the only direct role
being when it delegates the initial decision (a decision which itself is usually advised
on by NICE). It can hence be argued that NICE is a good example of a ‘depoliticised’
institution with minimal central government input (Syrett 2003, 728). Yet, health
technology appraisals are hardly uncontroversial, and somewhat paradoxically
NICE also created ‘new layers of subjectivity and policy meddling’ (Brown and
Calnan 2011, 2) as it ‘politicised questions of priority setting and rationing’ by
making issues of rationing an ‘explicit’ national task as opposed to an ‘implicit’ local
task (Landwehr and Böhm 2011, 680). Moran (2003, 141) argues that this is a clear
example of ‘hyper-politicisation’—‘the breakdown of the old doctor-dominated
systems of control, and the translation of rationing issues into increasingly open
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political argument’. This policy area hence presents a good opportunity for a case
study—depoliticised decision making in a situation of (potentially) high pressures
for politicisation—and this is particularly pertinent in the case of Herceptin itself.
Herceptin (medical name ‘trastuzumab’) is a prominent example of a ‘targeted’
biomedical drug, a new breed of drugs developed in the 1980s–90s which ‘provide
the link between an individual’s molecular and clinical profiles ... allowing patients
the opportunity to make informed and directed lifestyle decisions’—thus ‘person-
alising’ the medical process (Ginsburg and McCarthy 2001, 491). Herceptin targeted
a particular form of breast cancer—‘HER2-positive’—which involves faster growth
of tumours and a more aggressive form of the disease, with survival time as little as
nine months (NICE 2002, 2). While Herceptin had previously been recommended
by NICE in 2002 for late-stage HER2-positive patients, before May 2005 it had not
been approved for those at earlier stages.
However, in May 2005 new findings on Herceptin’s ‘early stage’ effects were
announced from the Herceptin Adjuvant (HERA). International pharmaceutical
distributor Roche claimed the drug had potentially radical, even curative effects,
including a 50% reduction in return after early stage treatment. This amounted to
‘the first evidence that Herceptin had the potential to reduce the risk of cancer
coming back at an early stage and to prolong life for women with this aggressive
form of the disease’ (Roche 2005a). Hence, although doubts persisted within the
medical community over negative effects upon patients with previous heart prob-
lems (Keidan 2007) Herceptin came into public view not only as a new, potentially
curative treatment to a debilitating disease that could be given to patients with a
high probability of success. As one interviewee stated:
Why is Herceptin interesting? Well, because it was the first of a new type
of treatment that was produced so that it was a targeted therapy. You
didn’t have to treat all patients, you could identify which patients would
do well ... the response was dramatic (Interview, former Roche executive,
January 2012).
As of May 2005, however, the EMEA had not licensed Herceptin for the European
market, and hence NICE could not begin its appraisal process. Were Herceptin fully
licensed and recommended by NICE, PCTs would be legally obliged to fund treat-
ment to all eligible patients. Here, though, given Herceptin was unlicensed and no
guidance was yet available, instances where treatment was requested were dealt
with by PCT boards on a case-by-case basis. PCT boards could consider any patient
requests to be provided with Herceptin for free using PCT funds, but had discretion
over whether to provide funding depending upon available resources (which
patients could appeal against). This led to geographical disparities in the provision
of Herceptin, because of the substantial cost involved and unequal resources across
PCTs, and hence a ‘post-code lottery’ emerged. Given that the ‘(elimination of the)
post-code lottery of care was according to political pronouncements the raison
d’être for the establishment of NICE’, this presented an acute predicament
(Littlejohns 2001, 40). In theory, Herceptin was just one example of a systemic
problem often termed ‘NICE blight’ or ‘the delay between product launch and
availability of NICE guidance’ (Barham 2008, 1037). However, several interviewees
noted Herceptin is widely considered ‘exceptional’ or ‘defining’ due to the extent of
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political interest. In this case, NICE’s processes were brought into question, and
ministers were under significant pressure to push through guidance and end the
‘post-code lottery’. The next section examines the empirical evidence, firstly ana-
lysing the emergence of an ‘issue network’ around Herceptin.
Playing Out the Post-Code Lottery: Pressures
for Politicisation
The Herceptin post-code lottery crisis was played out from roughly 19 May 2005
when Roche first presented evidence to the American Society of Clinical Oncolo-
gists’ (ASCO) Conference, up to the final NICE appraisal released on 23 August
2006. There were three key periods: ‘crisis emergence’, ‘crisis peak’ and ‘crisis
diffusion’.
Crisis Emergence
In the first period Roche’s high profile presentation of the HERA trial findings at the
ASCO Conference initiated an international clamour for access to Herceptin. As one
interviewee recounted:
It was a very emotional period; people were astounded that the results
were better than anyone had ever anticipated. That got reported by the
press in the UK as it did in every country in the world that this was the
breakthrough cancer that for the first time had shown these dramatic
results, and patients wanted to get hold of it (Interview, former Roche
executive, January 2012).
The presentation created an almost euphoric media reaction. Whereas only 13
Herceptin articles had been published in national news articles since November
2003, May 2005 produced 10 articles alone, all of which had a positive slant
towards Herceptin. Importantly, the first ‘case study’ of a patient, Barbara Clark,
who was eligible for Herceptin but denied treatment by North Somerset PCT was
also highlighted (BBC News 8 June 2005) and raised by her MP in parliament (HoC
Deb 30 June 2005, 435: 1543). Already, there was pressure to conform to interna-
tional trends and circumvent existing regulatory processes. The issue network at
this stage, however, was not fully developed. Domestic pressure was largely local-
ised, and, as Figure 2 (below) shows, national press coverage was relatively low.
Crisis Peak
However, as is clear from Figure 2, from mid-September to late-November there
was a much more sustained period of media pressure. National interest became an
almost daily occurrence, with 24 pieces in September, 87 in October and 49 in
November. One interviewee recalled the intensity:
Herceptin gave some particular difficulties for us because NICE generally
wouldn’t comment until we were formally working on a piece of guid-
ance. The queries from journalists and others were coming in well before
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we got to that stage, putting the NICE press office and DH press office
under quite a lot of pressure ... It was on a daily basis, the NICE press office
took around 60 calls a week from journalists just about our work, it was
a really busy press office and a significant proportion of those were about
Herceptin for the whole period it was going on. So Herceptin did put real
pressure on the press office (Interview, former manager of NICE commu-
nications team, January 2012).
Interviewees from both DH and NICE agreed that this pre-assessment period was
the most intensely ‘difficult’ period of media pressure. Here, there was an intensi-
fication of pressure group activity, particularly from long-campaigning cancer char-
ities such as Breakthrough Breast Cancer and Cancer Bacup (Hind et al. 2011, 24)
but also a more temporary pressure group, Women Fighting for Herceptin (WFH).
Having featured on Radio 4’s Women’s Hour programme in August, a small group of
Staffordshire patients took their campaign national, aided by public relations firm
Porter Novelli (The Guardian 29 March 2006) and Roche’s own media campaign
accompanying publication of the HERA findings in October (Roche 2005b). WFH
submitted a petition to Downing Street signed by 34,000 people, and were given a
meeting with Health minister Rosie Winterton. The event gained national media
coverage leading The Sun to launch an appeal urging Patricia Hewitt (Health Sec-
retary) to ‘make Herceptin available immediately’ (The Sun 29 September 2005) and
parliamentary motions to speed up the process (HoC Deb 21 October 2005, 437:
1270W; HoC Deb 22 November 2005, 439: 1358). As one interviewee remarked:
‘(t)here was a lot of stuff in the media, a lot of activity and these groups became very
prominent and somehow struck a chord with society’ (Interview, NICE Executive
Director, January 2012).
Moreover, several patients launched legal challenges against PCT decisions denying
them treatment. Firstly, North Somerset PCT designated HER2-positive patient
Barbara Clark an ‘exceptional case’ after she threated action in the European Court
of Human Rights. The importance of this event is clear, as 3 October marked the first
peak in media interest (see Figure 2), and Clark would become the most mentioned
patient (Wilson et al. 2008, 128). As various patients challenged their PCTs on legal
Figure 2: National News Articles Published on Herceptin
(14 May 2005–19 February 2006)
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grounds following this reversal, ‘the Herceptin campaign rose to fever pitch’
(Keidan 2007). In November, North Stoke PCT and WFH member Elaine Barber
threatened legal action after being denied Herceptin on grounds of cost and heaving
an appeal rejected (Mayor 2005). Barber’s subsequent legal threat led to the PCT
agreeing to reverse its decision, on grounds of ‘exceptional circumstances’ (Mayor
2005). These mounting legal challenges, driven by expert solicitors Irwin Mitchell,
provided a focal point for media attention on the Herceptin issue, as one inter-
viewee noted: ‘The main media interest was around when the cases were being
issued or the hearings or decisions. So the media tried to work the story around the
cases as opposed to around the general public campaign’ (Interviewee, Solicitor,
January 2012).
Crisis Diffusion
In February, media coverage peaked as Swindon PCT patient Ann Marie Rogers
became the first to take her appeal to the High Court. When Rogers’ case was
rejected (Dyer 2006), a storm of negative media coverage followed (e.g. BBC News
15 February 2006, see Figure 2). The percentage of articles criticising the ‘post-code
lottery’ reached its highest since May 2005 (77.9%), and there was only one
‘positive’ article that month towards the ability of patients to access Herceptin, out
of 68. A Panorama programme entitled ‘Wanting the Wonder drug’ also created
negativity, emphasising the personal experiences of participants in the WFH cam-
paign (BBC Panorama 7 February 2006).
By now, however, the appraisal process was already underway, as NICE had
appointed the Evidence Review Group (ERG) for assessing Herceptin, based around
a new ‘Single Technology Appraisal’ (see below) that started the appraisal process
in line with, rather than after the licensing decision. On 7 February NICE received
evidence on Herceptin from Roche and on 17 February Roche applied to the EMEA
for a European license. Significant media coverage and Parliamentary debate on the
topic continued through April (Hind et al. 2011, 42), as the Court of Appeal’s
‘landmark judgement’ on 12 April overturned the High Court’s ruling on Ann
Marie Rogers (The Independent 13 April 2006). However, because the regulatory
process was already underway, with licensing expected by late-May and a NICE
decision shortly afterwards, the issue’s salience decreased.
This diffusion of pressure continued through to the later stages of the assessment
process, as Hind et al. (2011, 42) and Abelson and Collins (2009, e120) show.
Although Newbury and Community PCT appealed against NICE’s draft guidance
published on 9 July, this was swiftly rejected by a NICE review panel (NICE 2006a)
and final guidance was issued on 23 August recommending Herceptin for treatment
‘for women with early-stage HER2-positive breast cancer following surgery,
chemotherapy (neoadjuvant or adjuvant) and radiotherapy (if applicable)’ (NICE
2006b, 4).
The above analysis suggests that a distinctive ‘issue network’ emerged around
Herceptin during its appraisal. It is clear that there was a substantial increase in the
salience of Herceptin as an issue in the wider public sphere, and the participation of
various legal, medical, political, journalistic and marketing groups in pressurising
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government over the issue. This shows evidence of the emergence of an ‘issue
network’ based on a more critical and diverse environment of actors. Moreover
there were also more contests over legitimacy typical of an issue network, in the
sense that debates within the network became critical of existing governance
arrangements. This amounts to a significant amount of pressure from the network
on ministers to intervene in NICE’s appraisal and ‘fast track’ Herceptin. The remain-
der of this article shows, however, that NICE was arguably very resilient to this
pressure.
Maintaining Depoliticisation
Publicly declared actions of ministers developed roughly in line with political
pressures. In the ‘emergence’ crisis period the primary action was to refer Herceptin
to NICE. On 21 July Herceptin was referred outside the normal referral ‘waves’ of
health technologies (NICE 2005b). At this early stage, however, Herceptin was not
referred to as an ‘exceptional’ case, and DH referred Herceptin alongside Velcade,
another high profile drug used to treat Multiple Myeloma. Under-Secretary for
Health Liam Byrne was thus able to respond to controversy surrounding Barbara
Clark by stating that existing processes would remain:
It is perhaps inappropriate for NICE to determine the clinical effectiveness
and cost-effectiveness of a drug while its safety and efficacy are still under
consideration ... we cannot override the drug licensing process (HoC Deb
30 June 2005, 435: 1548–1549).
At this stage DH was seen as performing its primary function, namely, referring
drugs to NICE, and nothing more. More crucial is the ‘peak’ stage, in which
ministerial activity increased significantly. The most important action here was
Patricia Hewitt’s comment on 5 October, at the first peak of media pressure:
Herceptin has the potential to save many women’s lives and I want to see
it in widespread use on the NHS ... I want the licence for Herceptin to be
granted as quickly as possible ... and to be available within weeks of the
licence being given. I share the huge frustration of many women about
the delays in getting Herceptin licensed. I am determined to take action,
and this represents a major step forward in our fight against cancer (DH
2005).
This announcement led to further ‘interventions’. On 25 October the Health Sec-
retary made similar remarks to the Breakthrough Breast Cancer Fly-in, this time
compelling PCTs to fund Herceptin outside of NICE recommendations:
I have shared the huge frustration of many women about the delays in
accessing cancer drugs ... it has the potential to save as many as 1000 lives
a year ... I want to make it clear that PCTs should not refuse to fund
Herceptin solely on the grounds of cost ... I have asked (NICE) to start on
a fast-track appraisal (Hewitt 2005).
Prime Minister Tony Blair even suggested PCTs should ‘go ahead and allow people
to use (Herceptin)’ (BBC News 3 November 2005).
THE HERCEPTIN POST-CODE LOTTERY CRISIS 655
© 2014 The Author. British Journal of Politics and International Relations published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of the Political Studies
Association
BJPIR, 2015, 17(4)
Given the ‘unusual and exceptional’ amount of ministerial activity, as one inter-
viewee commented, it could be argued that ministers were essentially pre-
determining the assessment process (Mayor 2005). Such arguments only gain
greater salience when we consider that shortly after Blair and Hewitt’s statements
NICE introduced a ‘Single Technology Appraisal’ (STA) process as a way to ‘enable
single new drugs, and existing drugs with new indications to be rapidly assessed’
(NICE 2005a). Herceptin was the first drug to go through this quicker process which
ran alongside, rather than beginning after, the licensing decision by the EMEA,
hence aiming to close the gap in which a ‘post-code lottery’ could exist (for a full
description see NICE 2006c). That the introduction of the STA followed shortly after
ministerial statements about a desire to ‘speed up’ the appraisal process certainly
intimates some form of ‘political’ influence on NICE’s decision making, even sug-
gesting ministers leaning on NICE officials to achieve a positive appraisal. However,
close analysis of documents provided via a freedom of information request for all
correspondence between NICE and DH regarding Herceptin from 1 May 2005 to 1
September 2006 suggests this is not the case. This data is presented in Table 1.
Table 1 shows the number of emails exchanged between NICE and DH explicitly
mentioning Herceptin is very small. Even during the most intense periods of pressure
in October and November only a total of 8 emails explicitly mentioning Herceptin
were sent. The email subjects provided in columns 3–7 from the left also suggest that
the nature of this email communication was largely formalistic in nature. Emails
Table 1: Email Communications between DH and NICE Referring to Herceptin
(1 May 2005–1 September 2006)
Subject
Month
No. of Email
Communications Referral
Press
handling Consultation Other
May 2005 1 1 — — —
June 2005 1 1 — — —
July 2005 3 2 1 — —
August 2005 1 1 — — —
September 2005 0 — — — —
October 2005 3 — 3 — —
November 2005 5 — 5 — —
December 2005 2 — — 2 —
January 2006 0 — — — —
February 2006 0 — — — —
March 2006 2 — — — 2
April 2006 1 — — 1 —
May 2006 1 — — 1 —
June 2006 2 — 1 1 —
July 2006 1 — — 1 —
August 2006 2 — — 2 —
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from May–August focused largely upon the formal referral of Herceptin, specifically
NICE advising DH within a Joint Planning Group (JPG). There is a significant
exchange around the end of October regarding the coordination of the STA launch
(would it be a joint DH and NICE statement or separate ones?) and stock responses
for media questions on Herceptin. The clear theme, however, is not the decision to
implement STA itself, but coordination—who will say what, how will the image of
NICE independence be maintained and how will Herceptin be downplayed as a
driver of the new process. This press handling subsides as the STA appraisal for
Herceptin begins, and the majority of communication from December 2005–August
2006 relates to DH’s formal role as a consultee in the STA.
The data presented above suggests that contact (in email) was limited mainly to
formal communication in terms of DH’s referral and consultation roles. This finding
is supported by a NICE response to a House of Commons Select Committee report
on its activities:
There has never been any direct or indirect attempts by ministers to
influence our guidance once topics have been referred for consideration.
Sometimes we are asked to consider issues that generate significant public
interest and comment; and ministers may give interim advice to the NHS
on how to manage such issues while we are developing formal recom-
mendations. While our independent advisory committees are aware of
interim advice from ministers, this advice does not influence the formal
recommendations that they develop (House of Commons Health Com-
mittee 2008, 1).
This argument is reinforced by the evidence of interviewees from both DH and
NICE. As one interviewee bluntly stated:
What happened in the appraisal itself ... is, I’m being perfectly honest
here: business as usual. We carried out our appraisal in exactly the same
way as we carried out any other appraisal. No interaction with ministers
or DH in terms of what we should/shouldn’t be finding (Interview, NICE
executive director, January 2012).
It may hence be suggested that although a ‘politicising’ issue network emerged,
ministers did not seek to fully ‘politicise’—exert informal influence on—NICE’s
appraisal process. This evidence is limited in the sense that it does not account for
informal phone calls or face-to-face meetings, but what evidence there is does not
strongly support a counter-argument. One former NICE manager recalled informal
teleconferences with DH officials about upcoming recommendations, but this was
to manage media responses not discuss appraisal substance. A couple of inter-
viewees also suggested DH may have contacted NICE by phone once specifically
about Herceptin, but was flatly rebuffed. The question, then, is why was NICE
apparently resilient to external pressures?
Institutional Double Glazing
This section argues that ministerial intervention in NICE was avoided mainly due to
institutional constraints reinforced by prevalent cultural norms—‘institutional
double glazing’. This argument relates to the notion that ‘public organisations that
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are endowed with certain structural features ... enjoy higher survival chances than
those without these birth characteristics’ (Boin et al. 2010, 385). Lewis (2003, 143)
argues that ‘political insulation’ or formal bureaucratic autonomy ‘decrease(s) the
impact of changing administrations and changing majorities on the policies imple-
mented by administrative agencies’. The notion of ‘insulation’ is particularly useful
here, as it can be argued that the formal institutional design of NICE provided extra
protection for scientific decision makers, in a form of ‘institutional double glazing’
that acted as an effective barrier to intervention.
Importantly, the appraisal of any health technology is not technically carried out by
NICE but by the TAC appointed by NICE. Put simply, it can be argued that decision
making is not ‘one-step’ removed from central government but two steps removed.
DH appoints the chair of NICE, and meets senior NICE officials in high-level
quarterly reviews, but NICE appoints the TAC, which independently assesses evi-
dence, and senior NICE officials do not get involved with TAC decisions. As one
interviewee bluntly put it, ‘if Andrew [Dillon, Chief Executive] went to the com-
mittees, they would all resign’ (Interview, NICE Non-executive director, January
2012). While it is important not to overstate the formal independence of TACs—
NICE is legally responsible for final decisions—in terms of ‘de facto’ independence,
TACs are highly autonomous, as one interviewee stated:
Once we have established a programme, it insulates the decision making
from influences that are outside of the process to formulate the recom-
mendations. There’s no way DH or government can influence a decision
that NICE are in the process of appraising (Interview, NICE Executive
Director, January 2012).
One interviewee even suggested the whole point of NICE was to act as an insulator
for the TAC:
We’re not the ones who make the decisions, we’re not in the room ... On
Herceptin, the decisions were made by a TAC sitting in a room, experts
from throughout the health service. Obviously they’re human beings who
to some extent are influenced by what they see and read and [their]
experience. But actually what we saw one of our jobs as being ... was to
... catch a lot of the rubbish and form a protective barrier around the committee
so they could actually focus on the evidence and looking at the decision.
In my time there I never went to a TAC meeting, it wasn’t part of my role.
My role was ... to handle [the pressure] on their behalf and make sure that
they could sit in a kind of bubble with all the evidence and look at it
(Interview, former NICE communications manager, January 2012).
On top of this formal ‘barrier’, the appraisal process is highly formalised, and TAC
procedures for evidence submission by stakeholders and methods of appraising
evidence are specified in detail in several governance documents (NICE 2001; NICE
2004). The effect of this process was that once Herceptin had been referred, DH
became just one of several ‘consultees’, and, as Table 1 shows, was contacted
predominantly in that capacity once the process began. One interview in DH
described their role as one of wearing different ‘hats’:
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As well as the sponsor department, with a slightly different hat on we are
a legitimate consultee in its work ... once the topic has been referred we
become a consultee in the development of that. Almost at the moment of
that referral we swap hats ... our primary focus was on making sure that
NICE did as timely a job as possible doing what we needed to do as quickly
as possible but in the appraisal itself it wasn’t any different to what we
would do for anything else (Interview, DH manager, January 2012).
This point suggests that DH’s role was heavily circumscribed by official procedures,
which required it to fulfil specific roles at different points. Although DH officials
tried to rush the referral of Herceptin through as quickly as possible, any room for
influencing NICE informally was squeezed out by rule-based procedures. As one
interviewee put it:
The advisory bodies receive an evidence base from NICE and interpret it
according to standard NICE guidelines ... All of the comments that come
in/responses are made public on the website. You can’t do something and
then hide it, without having to explain yourself to someone else (Inter-
view, NICE Executive Director, January 2012).
Clearly, formal procedures are often followed because they coincide with informal
norms or ideas about ‘good practice’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004). Here, trust in
clinical/medical expertise can be seen as an important underlying ideational factor
reinforcing the more formal arrangements. The views of interviewees clearly
portray a highly developed norm of deference and trust in NICE’s clinical/scientific
expertise, related to its long-serving senior management team and deference to
medical science more generally. As one interviewee noted:
Two very strong features of NICE were credibility of the senior team and
their stability over a long period of time, which is quite unusual ... they
secured the confidence of ministers and others, because in the end min-
isters appoint the chairman. There was a long period of stability with Sir
Michael Rawlins and Sir Andrew Dillon and although there was always
criticism (and this was the sort of thing that ministers would get involved
in) ... All those debates were going on but they were about the framework
within which NICE operated rather than the decisions it was making ... on
the whole ministers left NICE to get on with it, and actually as its
reputation built that became easier and easier (Interview, Former DH
Senior Advisor, January 2012).
The elite interviews reflect a culture within Whitehall of deference to scientific/
medical expertise, particularly NICE’s reputation as an international leader in
reviewing evidence, as one interviewee put it: ‘The honest truth is what do min-
isters know about these things? It was an area of professional expertise’ (Interview,
Former DH Senior Advisor, January 2012).
Beyond formal and informal institutions, there is also evidence that ministers and
NICE officials enacted explicit strategies to deflect blame and prevent the crisis from
escalating (Boin et al. 2009). For example, ministers blamed PCTs and clinicians for
not supplying Herceptin sooner, as Hewitt (2005) argued that ‘As with other
unlicensed drugs, it is down to individual clinicians to decide whether or not to
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fund Herceptin ... PCTs must also be involved and will have to decide whether to
support the clinicians’ decisions and pay for Herceptin’. Similarly, Health Minister
Jane Kennedy asserted that ‘it is for clinicians to decide, in discussions with
patients, whether Herceptin is appropriate ... the NHS ... need(s) to make arrange-
ments to provide Herceptin’ (HoC Deb 22 November 2005, 439:1359 and 1362).
Moreover, as several interviewees noted, NICE was also developing its own ‘story’
about responding to the issue of ‘timeliness’, as illustrated by one Herceptin press
release:
We are aware of the need for timely advice on the use of new medicines,
particularly for life-threatening conditions such as cancer. The proposals
we have set out mean NICE can deal with the current backlog much
quicker than planned and that we will be able to issue guidance to the
NHS rapidly in the future, once a drug is licensed (NICE 2005a, 2).
This ‘timeliness’ issue was identified by interviewees as an important theme in
speeding up the introduction of the STA. These ‘narratives’ or ‘stories’ contributed
to deflecting and diffusing the ‘blame risk’ associated with crisis situations (Hood
2011). In this case, however, they can principally be interpreted as methods for
containing the crisis or stopping escalation to encompass wider issues of institu-
tional legitimacy, rather than efforts to prevent intervention in this specific case.
Conclusion
This article has made a distinctive contribution to analysing depoliticisation by
examining how depoliticised bodies are resilient to external pressure for politicisa-
tion. In doing so, it has utilised cognate perspectives on policy networks and
agencification to examine how NICE maintained its autonomy from DH during the
Herceptin post-code lottery crisis. Specifically, it was argued that ‘institutional
double glazing’: tight procedural rules and ‘double delegation’ critically reinforced
by norms of deference to scientific/medical expertise within Whitehall mediated
external pressures, such that politicisation was largely absent in this case. This
article has important implications for further research on depoliticisation. Return-
ing to the central ‘hooks’ of this article, it can be argued that it has implications in
three areas: empirical, analytical and theoretical.
Firstly, the article has contributed empirically by examining the resilience of a
depoliticised body (NICE) to external political pressure. This has implications for
existing methodologies, in particular the most explicit one to date developed by
Kettell (2008). Kettell (2008) develops a methodology which measures the success/
failure of depoliticisation based upon the societal reaction to certain depoliticisation
tactics. Where society accepts a policy developed through depoliticisation, the tactic
has been successful, whereas if society rejects the policy, depoliticisation has been
unsuccessful. In a sense, the empirical analysis in this article looks at
depoliticisation the opposite way round. Where an arm’s length relationship is
maintained despite external pressure, then depoliticisation has been ‘successful’,
whereas if ALB autonomy is overridden, then the attempt to move towards an
‘indirect governing relationship’ has failed. Future research into the success/failure
of depoliticisation might incorporate both analysis of ‘internal’ and ‘external’
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success and failure, the effects of depoliticisation on society, and the effects of
society on re-politicisation. Moreover, the identification of ‘institutional double
glazing’ as an important factor in the resilience of depoliticisation also suggests
further empirical research is needed into how politicisation is prevented. NICE, in
this case, was a ‘successful’ form of depoliticisation in the sense that it was sup-
ported by a structure of formal institutional rules and informal norms that meant
ministers did not seek to intervene in NICE’s decision making processes. Future
research may seek to further unpack the particular rules and institutional struc-
tures, their relationship with informal norms and ideas, and the extent to which
these prevent re-politicisation, particularly in comparative analysis across policy
sectors.
Secondly, this article has analytical implications in suggesting how the analysis of
depoliticisation can be broadened, whilst retaining a core emphasis on the success
and failure of depoliticisation tactics. It has suggested that engaging with cognate
literatures may facilitate such an endeavour. This has implications for recent work,
which has emphasised the importance of broadening analytical approaches to
depoliticisation to involve a range of societal processes and mechanisms that
support or reinforce institutional mechanisms deployed by governments, drawing
on Hay’s (2007) model (Wood and Flinders 2014). Empirical analysis has sought to
develop heuristic indicators of Hay’s forms of (de)politicisation through attempting
to map the transition of issues onto and off of public and political agendas (Bates
et al. 2014; Kuzemko 2014). One key argument of this article is that, in doing so,
scholars are operating (implicitly or explicitly) within a tradition of research into
state-society relations with a range of well-honed approaches that offer important
insights. While deploying a broader framework of (de)politicisation is distinctive
and intellectually stimulating, in order to avoid ‘reinventing the wheel’ scholars
should consider the insights of cognate concepts, such as ‘security’ (Kuzemko 2014)
and be cognisant of the potential for analytical overlap with well-established
approaches. Further research might examine how other cognate literatures might
be incorporated, and, moreover, how development of a fully-fledged analytical
framework including a broader range of (de)politicisation processes may proceed in
such a way that seeks to build upon, rather than displace, over half a century of
research into state-society relations.
Lastly, and theoretically, this article has offered some more general insights into the
depoliticisation thesis, in terms of how depoliticisation is effectively achieved.
Returning to the assertion that delegation can be useful for politicians to institu-
tionalise ideological preferences, the case demonstrates that this is far from straight-
forward. Rather it shows, as Rubin (2012) recently argued, ministers have to
constantly re-assert the need for relying upon expertise, society does not merely
accept it. Depoliticisation might hence be seen not as a one-way process of ideo-
logical assimilation, but as the institutionalisation of a particular mode of policy-
making, emerging and being continually reproduced in a context of periodic
contestation and struggle. Its success, ultimately, relies on whether the formal rules
of delegated governance can survive political crises and media storms. Of course,
given that only one case is examined here, the assertion cannot be made that
depoliticisation works this way in all policy spheres. It can be noted however, that
in very similar policy areas of ‘risk’, such as food safety, ministers very often face
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calls to intervene when a new crisis emerges, compared to areas like monetary
policy, where intervention is rarely called for (even despite the 2007 financial
crisis). Further comparative empirical study, as advocated by Hay (2014), may
identify similarities and differences in how depoliticisation is effectively achieved
more or less easily across areas of policy, and different political cultures.
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